Abstract: Purpose: To understand how the unfolding diet transformation in East and Southern Africa is likely to influence the evolution of employment within its agrifood system and between that system and the rest of the economy. To briefly consider implications for education and skill acquisition. Design/methodology/approach: We link changing diets to employment structure. We then use alternative projections of diet change over 15-and 30-year intervals to develop scenarios on changes in employment structure. Findings: As long as incomes in ESA continue to rise at levels near those of the past decade, the transformation of their economies is likely to advance dramatically. Key features will be: sharp decline in the share of the workforce engaged in farming even as absolute numbers rise modestly, sharp increase in the share engaged in non-farm segments of the agrifood system, and an even sharper increase in the share engaged outside the agrifood system. Within the agrifood system, food preparation away from home is likely to grow most rapidly, followed by food manufacturing, and finally by marketing, transport, and other agrifood system services. Resource booms in Mozambique and (potentially) Tanzania are the main factor that may change this pattern. Research Implications: Clarifying policy implications requires renewed research given the rapid changes in Africa over the past 15 years. Program Implications: Improved quality of education at primary and secondary levels must be the main focus of efforts to build the skills needed to facilitate transformation.
Introduction
The sustained surge in African economic growth over the past 15 years has by now been widely recognized (World Bank 2014; Radelet 2010; Young 2012) . Emerging evidence suggests that this income growth has begun to drive far-reaching changes in food demand among African households -a diet transformation (Tschirley et al forthcoming) . As expected from Bennett's Law, and as documented earlier in Asia by Pingali (2006) , this diet transformation involves a relative move away from cereal and tuber staples towards meat, fish, eggs, dairy, fruits and vegetables, and fats. Recent research also shows that the transformation involves a dramatic shift towards processed foods in urban and even rural areas (Dolislager et al forthcoming). Other research on diet transformations in the developing world has focused on the now widely documented nutrition transition (Popkin 2009 ) and on implications for natural resource use and environmental sustainability (Godfray et al 2010) .
However, diet change also drives structural changes in labor demand, a critical issue in current African policy debates given the unprecedented wave of youth expected to enter the labor market in coming decades (IFAD 2013) . Although Pingali (2006) mentions the employment issue in Asia, he does not explore it empirically. We do so for Africa in this paper, making two contributions to the literature.
First, we quantify the size of the agrifood system (AFS) -the entire set of actors and activities involved in producing, processing, packaging, and distributing agricultural products to consumers -in total employment. Previous research has identified only farming employment, putting all non-farm employment in categories such as manufacturing, industry, and services. Yet many of these non-farm jobs are linked to the AFS as we have defined it, and so will be affected by diet change. Second, using LSMS data from six countries of East and Southern Africa (ESA), we develop categorization schemes for food-and non-food expenditures, and for jobs, that allow direct linking of the two. We are then able to use projected changes in consumer expenditure across the expenditure categories, combined with scenarios on changes in labor:output ratios, to develop scenarios (a) on the future evolution of employment in the AFS compared to the rest of the economy, and (b) across levels within the AFS.
The employment question is of great currency due to Africa's extremely young population structure, which implies the entry of over 300 million youth into the labor market over the next 15 years and over 700 million over the next three decades. Given the large share of the AFS in African economies -where food occupies more than half of the average African consumer's expenditure -changes in the structure of employment in this system will have major implications for the types of jobs that these youth need to prepare for. Two dynamics are at work. First, in the early stages of structural transformation of an economy, non-farming sectors tend to be less labor intensive than farming, something we document in this paper. Second, there is concern that non-farming sectors may become even less labor intensive as the economy progresses, driven by larger-scale investment attracted by that very growth. These concerns are especially sharp in resource-rich countries, of which Africa has a growing number. The specter of "jobless growth" thus looms large in Africa: where will the hundreds of millions of youth, many of them born into farming families, find remunerative employment?
We focus on East and Southern Africa (ESA), and in particular on the countries of Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia. The broadly comparable consumption patterns across these countries -every country has large regions that are dominated by maize-based cropping systemsallows aggregation of country data with less concern for loss of local detail than if we were focusing on larger or more heterogeneous zones.
The next section reviews methods and data. Section 3 characterizes the unfolding diet transformation in ESA. We present current patterns of consumption and project them to 2025 and 2040. Section 4 presents employment results: current level and structure of employment in-and out of the region's AFS, our scenarios for changed employment structure to 2025 and 2040, and a discussion of those results in light of available evidence on empirical patterns to date. Section 5 briefly considers the implications of projected structural changes for education and skill needs. We conclude with a brief discussion of the wide-ranging implications of the findings and identification of key research needs.
Methods and Data

Methods
Our measurement of diet change and linked labor demand projections emerges from the following multi-step process. We first list these steps, then explain each in more detail. Additional details are provided in Annex A.
1. Categorize all consumption items into eight standard expenditure categories (i) -seven food categories and one non-food category -using the expenditure modules of LSMS data sets for each of the six study countries. Compute 2010 values of total consumer expenditure in each of the eight categories (C it , t=2010). 4. Combine growth rates in expenditure and population (step 3) with expenditure elasticities (step 2) to project growth in aggregate expenditure by category (non-foods and the seven food categories) over two successive 15-year periods: 2010 to 2025, and to 2040 (C it , t=2025 and t=2040). Conduct sensitivity analysis under alternative scenarios on the rate of growth in per capita income.
5. Use the employment modules of these same LSMS data sets to categorize all jobs into five categories (j), based on the segment of the economy in which they occur. The first four categories are based on the value chain segments of the AFS: (1) farming (agricultural production, whether by owner-operators or agricultural employees); (2) marketing, transport, and other services; (3) food manufacturing; and (4) food preparation away from home. Jobs outside the AFS constitute the fifth employment category (L jt , j=1-5, t=2010).
6. Estimate the share of total consumer expenditure in each expenditure category (i) that is captured by each of the four AFS value chain segments (the j without non-AFS):
S jit = share of each economic segment j in C it for all t All non-food expenditure is allocated to the non-AFS segment.
7. Allocate 2010 total consumer expenditure from the eight consumption categories (C it , t=2010; computed in step 1) into the five jobs categories (step 5) using the shares from step 6. Mathematically: * where C jt is consumption in the five jobs categories during year t. This is the analytical link between the eight expenditure categories i and the five jobs categories j.
8. Define total output (X) in each of the five jobs categories (non-AFS plus the four AFS value chain segments) as equal to each segment's total consumer expenditure from step 7 (C j ):
9. Compute aggregate labor/output ratios (LX) for each of the five jobs categories j using 2010 job totals (Step 5) and total output (steps 1 and 8) for the four AFS value chain segments plus non-AFS. In step 1, we use LSMS data sets for each of the six study countries to categorize all consumption items into eight groups: non-food, consumed own food production, and six categories for purchased food items, based on three processing levels and a perishable / non-perishable dichotomy. Purchased foods are unprocessed if they undergo no transformation from their original state beyond removal from the plant and (for non-perishables) drying. Processed foods are assigned to the high value added category if they satisfy at least two of the following three conditions: multiple ingredients; physical change induced by heating, freezing, extrusion, or chemical processes (i.e. more than simple physical transformation);
and packaging more complex than simple paper or plastic. Foods satisfying one of those criteria are classified as low value added processed. See Annex B for a list of the top ten food items (by value) in each of the six purchased food categories plus consumed own production. Briefly, the groups are dominated by the following in value terms: 2 2 These shares refer to our ESA countries minus Ethiopia.  Group 7 (perishable high processed): food away from home 72%; milk and milk products 14%;
In step 2, budget shares and elasticities for the eight product categories i were computed as described in Annex A. Each was computed separately for rural-and urban areas and for terciles of total household expenditure in each. Data from South Africa were used in the elasticity estimates to ensure proper curvature over the range of total expenditures that would be seen during the projection period, as these exceeded the highest values currently seen in the six other countries.
In step 3, rural-and urban population projections for all countries were taken from the 2014 UN revision. Two scenarios were defined for growth in real purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita incomes. A high growth scenario assumes a continuation of growth rates seen over the past 10 years -4.5% per year based on PovcalNet data for the five countries. The low growth scenario assumes 2%, which would imply policy reversals and other negative shocks to pull growth down sharply from its recent levels.
Step 4 integrates budget shares and expenditure elasticities from step 2, and population projections and total expenditure growth scenarios from step 3, into a consumer expenditure projection model. The model is used to project (under alternative scenarios) growth in demand for non-food and for each of the seven food categories over two successive 15-year periods: 2010 to 2025, and to 2040. We break the 30-year period in two because certain assumptions in our analysis, in particular that workforce participation rates will remain constant, might become less tenable out more than 15 years; the projections for that period remain potentially useful but clearly are subject to more uncertainty.
Step 5 uses the same LSMS data to compute jobs as the total number of full-and part-time jobs in each of the four AFS jobs categories and the single non-AFS category. Recall that the four AFS jobs categories are based on value chain segments -distinct functional levels or activities -in the AFS.
This categorization of jobs based on value chain activities makes it possible, in step six, to estimate the share of total consumer expenditure that accrues to each jobs category. This approach is equivalent to gross margin analysis that estimates the share of the final consumer price that accrues to each successive actor in the chain, from farmer through retailer. For example, 100% of value added in the food category "consumed own production" is from farming. For unprocessed non-perishable food (e.g., legumes or maize grain) purchased by consumers, we assume that 50% of total value added comes from farming and 50% from marketing, transport, and other services, which is equivalent to assuming that prices double from farm gate to consumer. We assume higher margins for perishable foods, with marketing, transport, and other services accounting for 60% of the consumer price, equivalent to a 150% increase from farm gate to consumer. The estimates used in the model are shown in a 5x8 matrix in Table 1 . Additional notes on how the shares were established are in Annex C. We report the results of sensitivity analysis on these shares in the results section.
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Step 7 analytically links the eight expenditure categories to the five jobs categories by use of these shares. The output from step 7 is the total value of consumer expenditure accruing to each of the five jobs categories / functional levels in the AFS. By defining output in each jobs category as equal to total consumer expenditure accruing to that category (step 8), labor:output ratios can be computed in step 9, and labor productivity in step 10 as the simple inverse. Table 2 shows these values, along with numbers of jobs in each category.
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
The rate at which labor leaves farm production over the course of development depends on the rate of growth in labor productivity in sectors outside of farming. Very rapid growth in labor productivity in these sectors will, for a given rate of overall economic growth, slow the transition out of agriculture.
Slower growth in labor productivity outside agriculture will, conversely, pull more labor out of farm production, again holding overall economic growth constant. Note that labor productivity is driven in large measure by capital intensity: highly capital intensive growth outside of agriculture drives up labor productivity in those sectors and makes it more difficult for labor to leave agriculture.
We return to these issues empirically later in the paper. Here, we use this logic in step 11 to develop three scenarios regarding growth in labor productivity and thus about the rate at which labor will leave agriculture. The general approach and the first two scenarios in particular, follow Timmer (2012) . The scenarios specify labor productivity growth for all sectors other than farming, including our single non-AFS sector. Farming is treated as a residual employer in each scenario and its labor productivity is inferred from model results. The scenarios are:
A. "Labor-intensive growth": This scenario assumes no growth in labor productivity outside the AFS, nor in any of the AFS sectors other than farming. As a result, labor is rapidly pulled out of (low productivity) farming into (higher productivity) non-farming activities. Structural transformation is accelerated, the pattern of income growth dramatically decreases inequality between farming and the rest of the economy, and poverty falls rapidly. This is an extreme case and unlikely to occur in practice, but captures elements of Asia's rapid growth in labor-intensive manufacturing over the past several decades.
B. "Capital-intensive growth": In this scenario, labor productivity grows in all non-farming jobs categories at the same rate that total demand in the category grows. Starting-and ending demand in the seven food item categories is mapped into jobs categories as in Table 1 and growth rates in each of these categories are derived. As a result, all non-farming sectors draw no labor out of farming, which must absorb all new labor and thus sees much less growth in labor productivity (incomes) than the other sectors. Structural change thus contributes nothing to growth, which is very unequally distributed across sectors. Like Scenario A, this is an extreme (and likely never seen in practice) scenario but captures elements of the very capital intensive growth outside of agriculture that can be seen in some resource rich countries.
Together, scenarios A and B put upper and lower bounds, respectively, on the amount of structural change in employment that would likely be seen in these economies. Each scenario thus generated, based on the assumed rates of growth in labor productivity, labor:output ratios in 2025 (and 2040) for all non-farming sectors (Step 12).
In step 13, end-of-period jobs in each of these sectors -the final objective of this exercise -were computed as the product of these labor:output ratios and total consumer expenditure in the category.
After defining the workforce as all individuals age 15-64 not "out of the job market" in step 14 3 , jobs in farming were computed in step 15 as the residual (total workforce minus all jobs in other sectors).
The model assumes constant shares of imports in food consumption. 
Africa's Unfolding Diet Transformation
Tschirley et al (forthcoming), Tschirley et al (2013) , and Dolislager et al (forthcoming) document the deep and broad penetration of processed foods in current consumption patterns of ESA. They also estimate very high elasticities -above 1.0 -for three-of the four processed foods categories: high value added perishable, high value added non-perishable, and low value added perishable. These results indicate that more diet change has already occurred than is widely appreciated, and suggest that the pace of change will remain rapid for some time.
Here we summarize the most salient aspects of current consumption patterns and present baseline results of the projection model to 2025 and 2040. These projection results feed into section 4 to project changes in employment structure.
Current consumption patterns and rates of change
The diet transformation in these countries is characterized by the commercialization of consumption (Dolislager et al, forthcoming) and the rise of processed and perishable foods (Tschirley et al, forthcoming) . Two key patterns stand out. First, the transformation has progressed deeply in terms of budget shares and broadly across rural-and urban areas and across the income distribution. Second, diet change is happening most rapidly among the three-quarters of the population that currently lies under the international poverty line of USD2 per capita per day in purchasing power parity terms. This is far earlier in the income distribution than is commonly appreciated, and means that diet change is putting great pressure on the AFS now for structural change to respond to these new demand patterns.
The next paragraphs present the empirical basis for these claims. Table 3 summarizes key food consumption patterns across the six countries as of 2010. We highlight three results. First, purchased food -all food categories other than consumed own production -accounts for 57% of all food consumption by value. This means that even in ESA, the least urbanized area of Africa, markets now exceed own production as the most important source of food 4 . Market reliance will be higher in other regions. We refer to this as the commercialization of consumption and find that it is not limited to urban elite. For example, households in the bottom tercile of total per capita expenditure rely on markets for 52% of their food, by value; the comparable numbers for all rural households and for rural households in the bottom tercile are 45% and 44%.
Second, processed food (low and high value added together) holds a 39% share of all food expenditure (including consumed own production) and a 68% share of purchased food expenditure. Note also that the share of highly processed foods slightly exceeds that of low processed, at about 36% of purchases compared to 32% (third column).
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 3.2. Projecting the changing composition of food demand Table 4 Under a continuation of recent growth, total expenditure increases by 2.9 times to 2025 and by 7.9 times to 2040. The expenditure rise is led by perishable, high value added processed foods ("Perishable -High Processed"), with growth multiples of nearly four to 2025 (an increase from USD 5.7 billion to USD20.8 billion) and over 11 to 2040 (USD5.7 billion to USD65.5 billion). Food budget shares for this item rise from 7.2% in 2010 to 10.1% in 2025 and 14% in 2040. Non-food is next in line, with growth multiples of 3.3 and 10.4, and total budget shares rising from 45% to 51% in 2025 then to nearly 60% by 2040. Processed foods as a group increase their food budget share from 39% in 2010 to 44% then 50%; this rise, however, is driven almost entirely by the highly processed group (perishable and nonperishable), whose share rises from 15% to 20% and then up to 25%. Purchased food demand (the final six categories) rises from USD45.5 billion in 2010 to USD125.8 billion in 2025 and USD314.4 billion in 2040, and from 57% of all food consumption to 67% by 2040. Food's share in total expenditure falls from 55% to 49% and finally to 40%.
The pattern of growth across expenditure categories remains the same if per capita expenditure grows only at 2% per year, while total expenditure doubles to 2025 and nearly quadruples to 2040, compared to near tripling and eight-fold increase under the higher growth scenario. Table 5 shows the expenditure values under each growth scenario mapped into our jobs categories, along with implied annual average growth rates for each category; these growth rates (except for farming) will be used in scenario C of the jobs projection model.
<TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE >
Implications for Changing Structure of Employment
The projection model
The current structure of employment provides the starting point for our projections. Table 6 shows, for 2010, the number and shares of jobs in our single non-AFS category and the four AFS categories. Jobs are a simple count of all full-and part-time jobs. Computing jobs as full-time equivalents would reduce the total numbers and reduce the share of farming in those numbers, since it is inherently seasonal.
Three patterns stand out. First, the AFS currently dominates employment in this region, accounting for over 80% of all jobs, nearly 90% of all rural jobs, and nearly 60% of all urban jobs. Second, most AFS jobs in the region are in farming (which includes own farming and hired labor), not in the other segments of the value chains: farming accounts for 93% of AFS jobs (81% of all jobs) in rural areas and 64% of AFS jobs (37% of all jobs) in urban areas. Third, jobs outside of farming but within the AFS -food manufacturing, marketing transport and other services, and food preparation away from homeaccount for 31% of all non-farming jobs overall (8% out of 25%), with little difference in share between rural-and urban areas. Non-farming employment in the AFS is most important for females, at 42% of all non-farming jobs held by females, compared to 24% for males; total non-farm employment of females within the AFS exceeds that of males by 4.2 million compared to 3.6 million, with the greatest gender difference being in food preparation away from home. 2. Exclude Asia and limit the regression to all SSA countries in the GGDC data base with incomes below $5,000. We chose this cutoff because mean incomes in the six ESA countries reach $4600 in 2040 in our high growth projections. This approach resulted in the lowest coefficient in absolute terms: -0.163.
3. The same as (2) but excluding resource rich SSA countries (Nigeria and Zambia; Botswana was already excluded in (2) due to high incomes). This approach gave the most negative slope coefficient: -0.226.
The large jump in the absolute value of the slope coefficient between (2) and (3) We return to the impact of resource rents later in the paper.
Results from version 1 are shown in Figure 1 ; with a slope coefficient about midway between the other two version, we use this in our model. Note that the relationship is steep at low levels of income:
growth from low levels (which describes nearly all SSA countries in 2010) results in very rapid declines in the share of farming in a country's workforce. As noted in the description of Scenario C, the farming workforce shares associated with our projected incomes in 2025 and 2040 are 61.0% and 47.2%, respectively under 4.5% growth, and 68.5% and 62.3% under 2% growth 7 .
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
All three jobs scenarios use demand projection results from Table 5 and the 2010 jobs numbers -total and per $1,000 of final consumer demand -from Table 2 . Table 7 shows the labor productivity growth parameters used for each scenario during each period. Parameters for Scenario C were generated by scaling down all non-farming labor productivity growth parameters from Scenario B by the same factor, to generate the needed farm workforce shares.
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>
Results for 2025 are presented in Tables 8 and 9 under the assumption that growth continues as it has over the previous 10 years, at 4.5% per year per capita. Six findings stand out. First, under idealized labor-intensive growth in all sectors outside of farming (Scenario A), the farm workforce declines in absolute numbers by more than 5%, and declines in share from 74.7% to 46.9%. In our "best bet" scenario (C), the farm workforce increases in size but falls in share to 61.0% (identical, as designed, to the level discussed above).
Second, except in Scenario B, where farming is forced to capture all job growth due to highly capital intensive growth off the farm, sectors outside of farming account for most growth in jobs: 66% in our structural Scenario C, and over 100% in Scenario A. The latter result is because labor intensive growth in the rest of the economy draws tremendous numbers of people off the farm, driving the absolute fall in farm workforce noted above.
Third, the rest of the economy outside the AFS captures most job growth except in Scenario B. In Scenario C (best bet) the economy outside of the AFS captures nearly half (48%) of all job growth, farming captures 34%, and non-farm activities within the AFS capture the balance (18%).
Fourth, the rapid rise in demand for processed foods and for food prepared away from home causes total employment in food manufacturing, food preparation, and marketing and transport each to more than double in Scenario C (rises of 115%, 137%, and 103%, respectively). Yet their small starting share in employment means that they contribute relatively little to total job growth over 15 years: 5.4% of total growth comes from food manufacturing, 2.4% from food preparation away from home, and 10.1%
(because it started from a higher base) from marketing, transport, and other services.
<TABLES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE> Our fifth result, seen in Table 9 , is that Scenario C results in a slightly more equal distribution of incomes across sectors than exists in 2010. Labor incomes in farming nearly double (annual growth rate of 4.5%)
while in other sectors they rise by 30% to 40% (annual increases of around 2% in each sector). As a result, labor productivity ratios relative to farming fall in all sectors, with the maximum ratio (in food manufacturing) falling from nearly eight to 5.27. By design, due to its capital intensive growth that does not pull labor out of farming, Scenario B results in large increases in inequality across sectors while Scenario A sharply reduces this inequality. Note that all scenarios result in the same mean labor productivity. In absolute terms, however, incomes remain lowest in farming under all scenarios.
Finally, we see in Scenario C that overall labor productivity rises by 4.5%, nearly identical to that of agriculture and at least double any other sector. Overall labor productivity can grow at such a high rate due to the movement of labor out of low-productivity farming into other sectors with higher productivity; this is the contribution of the structural transformation of the economy to economic growth. In scenario B, which involved no structural transformation (farming absorbed all new labor), overall growth in labor productivity was lower than it was in every sector except farming.
Note that changes in the total expenditure shares of Table 1 have tiny effects on the numbers and shares of employment across activities, instead affecting incomes that accrue to each activity. For example, raising the farmer shares on non-perishables to 70% (from 50%) and on perishables to 50%
(from 40%) changes the marketing and transport employment shares only from 6.57% to 6.63%, with an equal decline in the farm share. Average farm incomes, however, rise by 11% (from by $1.29/day to $1.43/day), while marketing and transport average incomes fall by 28% (from $4.71/day to $3.41/day).
Dropping growth to 2% per year sharply moderates the move out of farming and thus slows the growth of the non-farm portion of the AFS. Under Scenario C, farming now accounts for 56% of all job growth to 2025 rather than 34%, and the non-farm AFS accounts for 13% rather than 18%. The relative growth of AFS segments remains unchanged, with food preparation away from home growing most in percentage terms, followed by food manufacturing, and finally marketing and transport. generates dramatically different results: farming still accounts for slightly more than half of all new jobs, with the non-farm AFS responsible for 14%.
Interpreting the model
The model we just presented is driven by assumptions about future trends in labor productivity.
Implicitly, it is thus driven by assumptions about the capital intensity of economic growth: more capital intensity raises labor productivity, limits the growth of jobs in the capital intensive sectors, slows transfer of labor out of the labor intensive (and lower productivity) sectors, and drives increased inequality -increased labor income differentials -across sectors of varying capital intensity. Farming is typically the most labor intensive and thus has the lowest labor productivity; we showed this empirically for our six countries in Table 9 . Policy makers are thus interested in two things: ensuring an increasingly productive and dynamic agriculture, and moving people out of farming over time and into sectors with higher labor productivity. What the model shows is that neither can happen without the other: broad income growth and poverty reduction requires the structural transformation of the economy.
We suggested that Scenario C, which is based on this long-term structural transformation relationship, is Figure 1 would predict, given changes in incomes during that time.
Yet both that relationship and the other recent research admit a great deal of variability across countries. For example, at a per capita income of USD5,000, empirically observed farming shares in the workforce range from about 37% to over 60% (Figure 1 ). Examining the countries of ESA in the
McMillan and Harttgen sample, jobs outside farming captured 92% of all job growth in Kenya but only 46% in Uganda and 32% in Rwanda. In the latter two cases, the farm share in employment fell (as it did in every country in the M&H sample), but only by three-or four percentage points, and from a high base (72% and 79%, respectively); together, these two factors resulted in the absolute number of jobs created in farming exceeding the number created off the farm.
We're left with two questions. First, can we develop more firm expectations regarding how the share of farming in total employment might play out over the coming two-to three decades? Second, can we Table 12 shows African and Asian countries from the GGDC database ordered in descending negative value of the coefficient from a country-by-country regression of the same relationship as in Figure 1: farming's share in the workforce against log income per capita between 1990 and 2010. Four results stand out. First, every country in the sample except the resource-rich African countries had a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient on log income. Second, the three African resource-rich countries had the least negative and least significant coefficients; Nigeria in fact had a positive but insignificant coefficient. Third, even excluding these resource rich countries, African countries show great variability in this relationship, with coefficients ranging from -0.257 (Tanzania) to -0.688 (Kenya).
Finally, and again excluding the resource-rich countries, the coefficients themselves appear to show a strong positive relationship to income: countries with higher incomes appear to achieve less reduction in farming's workforce share for a given percent increase in income.
Replicating the pooled regression of Figure 1 while adding a variable for the share of natural resource rents in GDP confirms the effect of natural resource dependence: a 10 percentage point increase in the share of natural resource rents in the economy increases farming's share in the workforce by 1.9
percentage points while leaving the coefficient on log income nearly unchanged. 8 The negative effect of natural resource dependence on the movement of labor out of farming is consistent with the highly capital intensive nature of natural resource exploitation -pushing things in the direction of Scenario B in terms of our projections. Mozambique now exports coal, and it and Tanzania have discovered large new natural gas resources. Unless the governments of these countries put in place policies that encourage growth in labor intensive sectors of the economy, these results suggest that both might see slower structural transformation even with high rates of growth.
<TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE>
Further analysis of the factors driving variation across countries in the relationship between income and farming's share of the workforce is beyond the scope of this paper. Summarizing the evidence we've assembled, however, strongly suggests that, unless growth slows sharply, the countries of ESA will, on average, see a substantial shift of labor out of farming, from 75% in 2010 probably to around 60% by 2025 and 50% or below by 2040. Africa's farming workforce share (13.6%) 9 is less than half the predicted level from the model in Figure 1 (29.6%). Note also that nearly 12% of that 13.6% is hired farm labor. Largely as a result, the share of AFS jobs in South Africa's economy is low, at only 27.9%.
Insights from South Africa's employment structure
That said, the structure within South Africa's AFS (see the bottom portion of the This too is consistent with the fact that demand and employment in this sector are projected to rise far faster than in the other three AFS sectors.
<TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE>
Implications of projected structural changes in the agrifood system for education and skill needs
Before closing we briefly consider the topic at the core of this special issue: the implications of agrifood system transformation for skill acquisition and education. Table 14 shows educational attainment and related variables in the six countries of ESA plus South Africa, broken down by our jobs categorization with one modification: for the education variables we have split farming into own farming and farming labor. The first is that levels of education are very low in ESA. Only 2% of the workforce has completed tertiary education, 82% have completed primary or less, and 29% have not completed even a single year of primary school. Thus, the bulk of the workforce now and for some time in these countries will be people with only a primary education. Mass education at tertiary level is a distant dream in these countries.
<TABLES 14 AND 15 ABOUT HERE>
9 This figure is computed from the 4 th quarter 2010 QLFS. GGDC provides a similar figure for 2010, 15%.
Second, the farming workforce is the least educated in ESA, while in South Africa farm owners are the most educated while farm laborers are the least educated. This pattern reflects the long history of very large-scale farming engaged in almost entirely by white farmers in this country. Note that educational attainment in the six ESA countries is substantially higher in all non-farm segments of the AFS than in farming. This suggests that the returns to education -and the current and future need for it -are higher in these segments. The fact that returns to labor in farming are projected to stay lower than in all other sectors even through 2040 supports this contention.
Third, even in South Africa, typically 90% of workers in the AFS (aside from farmer-owners) have at most a secondary education (Table 15) . Fifty-to sixty percent have no more than a middle school education.
Fourth, growth rates in labor productivity have major implications for rates of skill and knowledge acquisition. Scenario C requires that farm labor productivity rise by 4.5% per year if overall growth continues at recent rates. Output per person will have to nearly double. Such growth will not be achieved without much greater use of external inputs, including in some cases mechanization. This external input use will have to be paired with greater knowledge and skill among farmers; farming in 2025 and 2040 will have to be a more knowledge intensive activity than it was in 2010. There is little escaping the conclusion that primary-and secondary school is where most effort will have to be made if worker skills are to facilitate rather than hinder the kinds of transformations that are now underway.
Enrollments at these levels have risen rapidly in most African countries but quality -actual student achievement -has lagged or even fallen (Filmer and Fox, 2013) .
The challenge in other sectors may appear less extreme but may not be so. Labor productivity in those sectors need grow only at half the rate of farming. Yet the farming sector has one benefit in this regard:
the vast majority of those who will be farming in 2025 and 2040 will be those who are farming today or those born to families that are farming today. They will have a deep farming background. Meanwhile, the other sectors will be absorbing many people moving out of farming: the overall workforce over the 15 years to 2025 will increase by nearly 50 million but the farming workforce, if recent growth continues, will increase by only 17 million (Table 8 ). The other 33 million will be moving into other sectors that will require new skills for which these workers may have little background.
Summary and Conclusions
The projections in this paper are based on one empirical regularity and reflect two economic laws. The empirical regularity is the robust relationship between a country's per capita income and the share of its workforce engaged in farming (Timmer, 1988) . This relationship formed the basis of Scenario C. The relationship is a manifestation of Engel's Law, which makes it plain that, as incomes grow, expenditure on non-food items will grow more rapidly than expenditure on food, even as both rise in absolute terms.
Our empirical results on changing consumption patterns reflect this law. The second economic law at play in our analysis, Bennett's Law, states that consumers will move, in a relative sense, away from staples (in the African case cereals and tubers) as their incomes rise, and towards meat, fish, oils, and fresh produce (Bennett, 1954; Timmer et al, 1983) . Our empirical analysis of consumption patterns also reflects this law, while adding the finding that households are also likely to move strongly towards increasingly processed foods as their incomes rise, and indeed have already done so to a degree not widely appreciated.
We conclude that, as long as incomes in ESA continue to rise at some level near what they've done over the past decade, the transformation of their economies that has already begun (McMillan et al 2014) is likely to continue and advance dramatically. The key features of this transformation will be: a sharp decline in the share of the workforce engaged in farming even as absolute numbers rise modestly, a sharp increase in the share engaged in non-farm segments of the AFS, and an even sharper increase in the share engaged outside the AFS. Evidence from South Africa gives credence to our model results suggesting that, within the AFS, food preparation away from home will grow the most rapidly, followed by food manufacturing, and finally by marketing, transport, and other AFS services. Depending on how they're managed, resource booms in Mozambique and Tanzania are the main factor that may change this pattern. Of course, a sharp slowing of economic growth will result in far less transformation of the region's economies.
Our brief consideration of the educational and skill acquisition implications of these changes suggests that improved quality of education at primary and secondary level must be the main focus of educational efforts if the workforce of the future is to have the skills needed to facilitate these economies' structural transformation.
We close by noting that much of the broad-based work on employment in developing countries is about 30 years old (Squire, 1981; Krueger , 1981; Haggblade et al, 1986; Rosenzweig, 1988) . Work focused on rural-and urban micro-and small enterprises saw a heyday in the 1990s (Mead and Liedholm, 1998) .
The more recent work on rural non-farm employment (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007) 
Food Item Aggregation and Estimation of Budget Shares and Expenditure Elasticities:
We used LSMS data sets from seven countries to develop two distinct food item aggregations and to compute budget shares and estimated elasticities. South Africa data were used only in the expenditure elasticity estimates. The two food item aggregations were distinguished by (1) processing level and perishable/nonperishable as explained in this paper and Annex B, and (2) 27 food groups.
Engel's Law states that expenditure elasticities decline as total expenditure rises. Properly estimating by how much these elasticities decline with income becomes important when projecting consumption patterns out 30 years, during which time projected incomes will rise well beyond current levels. To generate reliable estimates for our purposes, we used LSMS data from all six countries plus South Africa. In summary, the approach took advantage of the wide variation of incomes across the LSMS data sets to estimate log-linear relationships between total expenditure and expenditure elasticities of demand estimated for each food group, separately by income terciles in rural and urban areas in each country. Elasticities for the projections were then selected using these relationships evaluated at midpoint total expenditure from each total expenditure tercile. The essential gains from this approach are that (1) the regression captured the non-linear relationship that typically exists between elasticities and income and (2) it did so over a range of income that, due to the inclusion of South Africa, included the highest projected incomes in the region. Finally, we use LSMS data from the six non-RSA countries to compute food budget shares and total budget shares for each of the categories explained above.
Both mid-point arc elasticities and Tobit-Engel elasticities were estimated. Models were run with each and delivered very similar results, with the only meaningful difference in 2040 budget shares emerging for consumed own production: models based on Tobit-Engels elasticities projected larger declines in this items than did the models based on midpoint arc elasticities. Projection results mentioned in the paper are based on the average of model results from each set of elasticities.
ESA Aggregation: To create the aggregated ESA estimates we calculated population weighted averages of the non-RSA country level data for all per capita calculations, and all ESA total values were generated by summing the 66.37% of the ESA population that our non-RSA LSMS data represent.
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